Karl Jaspers : Freedom and Transcendence
最近有意外有幸，竟然能重溫碩士論文撰寫期間，在馬賽爾、路與陸達誠神父，以及雅斯培之間的一些閱讀、思考與記憶。前兩天，在清明節神明廳內的書桌上，重新閱讀不知何時放了一本當時在雙葉書局所買《形上學》現代導論文獻選集。那是我在李震神父的哲學問題討論課程中，乃至在考慮要以馬賽爾作為碩士論文題目，而需要閱讀英文文獻當中的兩篇文章，並都是討論到「存有的奧秘」，並且已經重新將其摘露出來，並放在部落格上。
而在這本書《形上學》里，最後還有一篇是雅斯培〈實存與超越者〉文章，是收入在他1949出版《哲學的永恆範圍》(The Perennial Scope of Philosophy)書中。這篇文章昨晚也將其整理，並透過AI的掃描與翻譯加以完成。
但所謂的「綜攝」，乃是雅斯培在 一九三零年代以後他把他的哲學思考模式，從原先的「世界、人、與超越者」三部，再賦予一種源自於康德哲學中「理性」的三種「規約原理」即具有三種「統合」功能，從而將存在分為兩種認識論模式，一為內在的認知模式（包含經驗存在、意識、精神之於世界），一種為超越的認知模式（實存之於超越者），就好像牟先生區分「內在存有論」與「超越的存有論」。不過最重要的，是這篇〈實存（也就是人或人自體）與超越者〉的意涵，可以當成是一種去理解如「道德形上學」如孔子「下學而上達」之「五十而知天命」（即天人之間/際），或與如「天何言哉，四時行焉、百物生焉」的現代豐富意涵。
最後我想起在千禧年所寫一篇〈錢穆先生如何理解孔子「五十而天命」一語〉的論文裡當中也把雅思培的實存與超越者之「歷史地存在形上學」（historically existential metaphysics）與「哲學的信仰」（philosophical faith with religion）加以表述，因為二者的進路何其類似。
僅摘錄論文第九節內容如下:
九、西方的觀點
在這裡，容許我們將雅斯培本康德而來的道德思想介紹進來，以稍做比觀。上述錢先生所說「即是人生規範與人生自由之合一」（如「克己復禮為仁」）的情境，與徐先生所說「這種天命卻會不容已地要求自己對之發生無可推委逃避的責任感和信心」與「『五十而知天命』乃是此種無限的責任感和信心的真切證驗」云云，似近於康德所言，人在「自然因果性 」與「意志因果性 」之間所產生相異的一種「悖論」(antinomy)。更確切的說，那可說是人在尊敬與服從「善地道德意志」(morally
good will）的「無上命令」 (Categorical Imperative) 時，在「存在情境」(existential situations)世界中所發生的深刻難題。誠如雅斯培(Karl
Jaspers)所說，當人面對前述這種難題、這種背論時，人總是在某種神聖的召喚中，由從「超越者」(Transcendence)中「所被授予了自己」 (being given to himself) 的層層限制中日益向真理的核心挺進。人把自己揭開的可能性延伸到極致邊境，並可以義無反顧地採取「無條件行為」(unconditional act)，甘心順服他心中的「超越者」所發出的命令，並被此所實踐的可能性中所蘊含的無上神秘法則所要求，所束縛，也因此體現出的所謂「自由」的真義。人忠誠地順服於這種必然要求，而奇詭的是，人由此所展示的限制與束縛，卻也由此帶給人心靈的歡愉與自由。
順此說法推擴，實則西方悲劇觀的「知命學」，本蘊含著雅斯培所說「成為一個人」(becoming a man)的真理。此世界成了一個「神聖」的境地。此種「知命觀」之於悲劇英雄可說是必然的，是悲壯的，更是一種高貴超越的生命態度。悲劇英雄沒有迴避，是貫徹生命中的必然結局，應然地承擔起生命中的當然之必。對外人來說，這是固執求真，令人敬畏的，但也令人憐憫，悲劇英雄選擇了他一生必然要全然投入的生命之愛。就理智而言，那一樣是一種魚與熊掌二者無法兼顧的「唯一」抉擇。在這裡我們看到生命的一種莫大神秘與森嚴法則，以及一種幾近一無反顧、全然投入的承擔。這不是依靠哲學上的形上的知識，以及圓熟的思辯，而是一種行動上無所迴避直接而正面的回應，是一種充滿著直接而劇烈的悲壯觀(tragic vision)。如果這種詮釋是大體正確的話，則悲劇英雄「知天命」當忠於他所發現嚴厲而無情的最後生命的奧秘。這也是一種對他生命的徹底一種解決。一種對其命運的勝利。沒有迴避、託辭。
但這種由西方悲劇觀與康德式的道德哲學而來的說法，其實對孔子知天命的義理脈絡而言，大體只是「表面的」詮解。它並不正確。不正確的原因，是因為上述說法忽略孔子更深層所言的「學」與「樂天知命」精神，以及一種「用之則行，舍之則藏」與夫「吾道一與貫之」的真正自由。依錢先生之見，我們應知道「五十知天命」對孔子而言，除了前述藉由「下學」而至的「當然之必」與「何以當然者而竟不可通，何以不可通而仍屬當然」之慨嘆之外，更代表著一種「不怨天，不尤人，下學而上達，知我者其天乎」之「知天樂命」的精神。孔子在此轉出一種更深的「樂」； 融合著一種至高無上的自信、悅樂與信守；一種「人不知而不慍」[1]與「知我者其天乎」[2]之「天人之間」相知的境界。
但後人常把這種說法當成「光景」把玩，甚至高談「性命天道」，轉成不切於「人事」。孔子的「知天命之學」，毋寧當從下學與「不怨天，不尤人」為階梯、為進路，纔更為穩妥。錢先生以為，必須經由從學習「不怨天，不尤人」的下學為階梯，經由這種「下學」的歷程才能「上達」知天命，纔進而顯出天有其終極「難知」的超越一面，卻又同時必須「接受」天所降於己身的這種「義命」[3]。不但對己所終難盡知與逾越的「天命」保持敬意，但又對天之所命切於己的「義命」踐履中，有著一番「吾道一以貫之」與「無入而不自得」的自由與悅樂。
「天命」既是不能由「客體(對象)的知識」(objective knowledge)或「自然狀態」(thr state of
nature)所能解釋的東西，因而總有人不知的一面，天命總是產生於「生乎自由之內」[4]，只有從這個忠誠於知命的深處與實在中所產生的視觀中，人才能周全地透視所有實際存在與發生的事物，達到人與天所可能獲至的一種神祕而超越的整體關係。
[1] 錢穆先生在《論語新解》中解此曰：「人不知而不慍：學日進，道日深遠，人不能知。雖賢如顏子，不能盡知孔子之道之高之大，然孔子無慍焉。慍，怫鬱義，怨義。學以為己為道，人不知，義無可慍。心能樂道，始躋此境也。」見聯經版3，頁3。
[2] 《論語新解》中錢先生解此說：「不怨天，不尤人：尤，非之之義。孔子道不行於世而不怨天，知天命有窮通。人不己知而不非人，知人事有厄，亦皆由天命。下學而上達：下學，學於通人事。上達，達於知天命。於下學中求知人道，又知人道之原本於天。由此上達，而知道之由於天命，又知道之窮通之莫非由於天命；於是而明及天人之際，一以貫之。天人之際，即此上下之間。天命我以行道，又命我以道之窮，是皆天。知我者其天乎：孔子之學先由於知人，此即下學。漸達而至於知天，此謂上達。學至於知天，乃歎惟天為知我。本章重在「下學」兩字。一部論語，皆言下學。能下學，自能上達。無怨無尤，亦下學，然即已是上達之徵。孔子反己自修，循序漸，以致其知。知愈深而怨尤自去，循至於無人能知、惟天獨知之一境。故聖人於人事能竭其忠，於天命能盡其信。聖人之學，自常人視之，若至高不可攀；然一本十室之邑所必有之「忠信」而又「好學」以達此境。故下學實自忠信始。不忠不信以為學，終無逃於為小人之下達。至於捨下學而求上達，昧人事而億天命，亦非孔門之學。深讀論語者可自得之。本章孔子自述為學，極平實，又極高遠，學者恐不易遽明。能在心中常存此一境，而沉潛反復於論語之全書，庶乎有一日可望見其有所卓然之處。」見聯經版3，頁531-533。
[3] 《論語》有一章言:「有公伯寮愬子路於季孫。子服景伯以告，曰：「夫子固有惑志於公伯寮，吾力猶能肆諸市朝。」子曰：「道之將行也與，命也。道之將廢也與，命也。公伯寮其如命何？」錢先生解:本章當與上章「不怨天不尤人」合參。人道之不可違者為義，天道之不可爭者為命。命不可知，君子惟當以義安命。凡義所不可，即以為命所不有。故不得於命，猶不失吾義。常人於智力所無可奈何處始謂之命，故必盡智力以爭。君子則一準於義，雖力有可爭，智有可圖，而義所不可，即斯之謂命。孔子之於公伯寮，未嘗無景伯可恃。孔子之於衛卿，亦未嘗無彌子瑕可緣。然循此以往，終將無以為孔子。或人稱孔子「知其不可而為之」，如此等處，卻似「知有可為而不為」，此亦學者所當細參。《論語新解》，頁533-535，聯經版3。
[4] 請參考雅斯培著，周行之譯 :《智慧之路》(The Way to Wisdom)，〈無條件命令〉一章（臺北 : 志文，1984），頁38-69 。
Karl Jaspers : Freedom and Transcendence
This selection is excerpted from a chapter in Jaspers's
The Perennial Scope of Philosophy (New York, 1949) and appears here with the
kind permission of the publisher, Philosophical Library, Inc.
這段文字摘自雅斯貝爾斯《哲學的永恆範圍》（紐約，1949 年）中的一章，經出版商哲學圖書館公司友好許可在此刊登。
Man's freedom, Karl Jaspers contends, is signified in the
belief that he opens out on infinite possibilities, and is not simply derived
from the world. Any insight into man that absolutizes him and makes him a
"nothing but" (for instance, Marxism, psychoanalysis, or race
theory), destroys this awareness of freedom, because man "is always more
than he knows about him-self" He "cannot adequately account for his sojourn
in the world by the laws immanent to the world.
卡爾·雅斯貝爾斯認為，人的自由體現在相信自己擁有無限的可能性，而不只來自世界。任何將人絕對化、使人「除了…之外什麼都不是」的洞見（例如馬克思主義、精神分析或種族理論）都會摧毀這種自由意識，因為人「總是比他自己所了解的更多」。他「無法用世界固有的規律來充分解釋他在世界上的旅程」。
Man's awareness of his freedom is at one with his awareness of his finite
natures. He understands that it is not "through himself that he is
originally himself," and he thereby becomes conscious of the fact that his
transcendence of death and dependence is brought about by transcendent help "It
is only through freedom that I become certain of transcendence"
人對自身自由的認知與對自身有限本性的認知是一致的。他明白“他並非透過自身而成為他自己”，從而意識到，他超越死亡和依賴的境界是藉助超越性的幫助而實現的。 “唯有通過自由，我才能確信超越。”
As a finite reality, man understands that he is not completely self-contained
as other creatures are, because his very sense of "openness" has bec0me
sign of his relation to another order, Though man is in bondage to "self
contained" finitude, it is his freedom that breaks through this bondage. Freedom
is therefore at the heart of man's sense his potentialities. And these
potentialities are infinite.
作為一種有限的現實，人類明白自己並不像其他生物那樣完全自給自足，因為他自身的「開放性」恰恰成為了他與另一種秩序關聯性的標誌。儘管人受制於「自足」的有限性，但正是自由打破了這種束縛。因此，自由是人感知自身潛能的核心。而這些潛能是無限的。
In the freedom of subjective conviction, says Jaspers, God's voice becomes audible...
and this is the only organ by whichits risk, however, since subjective
convictions are not fully warrented and secured, like so many investment loans
The fact The fact is, there can be no subjective security, It is risk, then,
and the consciousness of risk, that "remains the condition for increasing
freedom." It is risk that "excludes complete reliance on subjective
certainty, forbids the generalization of the subjective commandment into a
universal law, and bars fanaticism"
雅斯貝爾斯說，在主觀信念的自由中，上帝的聲音變得可聽見……而這正是它存在風險的唯一途徑。然而，由於主觀信念並非完全有理有據，也得不到保障，就像許多投資貸款一樣。事實上，主觀安全是不存在的。因此，風險以及對風險的意識，才是「增加自由的必要條件」。正是風險「排除了對主觀確定性的完全依賴，禁止將主觀誡命概括為普遍法則，並阻止了狂熱」。
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MAN CANNOT BE DERIVED from something else, but is
immediately at the base of all things. To be aware of this signifies man's
freedom, which is lost in every other total determination of his being, and
comes entirely into its own only in this one total determination. All empirical
causalities and biological processes of development would seem to apply to
man's material substratum, not to himself. No one can tell how far science will
advance in the knowledge of the development of this human substratum. And scarcely
any field of research is more exciting and captivating.
人根無法從其他事物衍生而來，而是萬物之根本。意識到這一點，便意味著人的自由，這種自由在對人存在的任何其他整體性規定中都會喪失，唯有在這唯一的整體性規定中才能完全實現。所有經驗因果關係和生物發展過程似乎都適用於人的物質基礎，而非人本身。沒有人能夠預知科學在認識人類這一基礎發展方面究竟會取得多大的進展。而幾乎沒有哪個研究領域比這更令人興奮、更著迷。
Every insight into man, if it is absolutized into a supposed knowledge of man
as a whole, destroys his freedom. And this is the case with such theories of
man, meaningful for limited perspectives, as have been propounded by
psychoanalysis, Marxism, racial theory. They veil man himself as soon as they
attempt to investigate anything more than aspects of his nature.
任何對人的洞察，如果被絕對化為對人整體的所謂認知，都會摧毀人的自由。精神分析、馬克思主義、種族理論等那些僅具有限意義的人性理論，正是如此。一旦它們試圖探究人性中除某些方面之外的事物，便會掩蓋人本身。
Science, it is true, shows us remarkable and highly surprising things about
man, but as it attains greater clarity, the more evident it becomes that man as
a whole can never become the object of scientific investigation. Man is always
more than he knows about himself. This is true both of man in general and of
the individual man. We can never draw up a balance sheet and know the answer,
either concerning man in general, or concerning any individual man.
誠然，科學向我們揭示了關於人的許多非凡且令人驚訝的現象，但隨著科學的不斷深入，我們越發清楚地認識到，人作為一個整體永遠無法成為科學研究的對象。人總是比他所了解的更豐富。這既適用於整體的人性，也適用於個體的人性。我們永遠無法透過簡單的權衡取捨來獲得答案，無論是關於整體的人性，還是關於任何個體的人性。
To absolutize knowledge that is always particular into a whole knowledge of man
leads to the utter neglect of the human image of man. And a neglect of the
image of man leads to a neglect of man himself. For the image of man that we
hold to be true is itself a factor in our life. It influences our behavior
toward ourselves and others, our vital attitude, and our choice of tasks.
將總是具有特殊性的知識絕對化為對人的整體性認知，會導致對人本身形象的徹底忽視。而對人本身形象的忽視，最終會導致對人本身的忽視。因為我們所認定的「人」的形象本身就是我們生活的一個重要因素。它影響我們對待自己和他人的行為、我們的生活態度以及我們對人生抉擇的選擇。
Each of us for himself is certain of what man is, in a way that precedes
scientific research and also comes after it. This is the prerogative of our
free-dom, which knows itself bound up with cogent knowledge, but is not
included in it as an object of cognition. For in so far as we make ourselves
the object of scientific inquiry, we see no freedom, but factuality,
finiteness, form, relation, causal necessity. But it is by our freedom that we
have awareness of our humanity.
我們每個人都對自己的本質有著確切的認知，而這種認知先於科學研究，也後於科學研究。這是我們自由的特權，它承認自身與確鑿的知識息息相關，但又不作為認知的對像被納入其中。因為如果我們把自己當作科學探究的對象，我們看到的就不是自由，而是事實性、有限性、形式、關係和因果必然性。然而，正是憑藉著我們的自由，我們才得以意識到自身的人性。
Let me sum up once again in order to gain a more secure foundation for our
consciousness of freedom.
為了更牢固地奠定我們對自由的認識基礎，讓我再總結一次。
Man cannot be understood on. the basis of evolution from the animals, In
opposition to this we have the thesis: Without such l evolution it is
impossible to explain his origin. Since this is the only intelligible
explanation and since everything in the world takes place in accordance with
intelligible laws, man must have come into being through such an evolution.
人類不能只從動物演化論的角度來理解。與此相反，我們有這樣的論點：如果沒有這種演化，就無法解釋人類的起源。既然這是唯一合理的解釋，而且世間萬物都遵循著合理的規律，那麼人類必然是透過這種進化而來的。
The answer: True, for our cognition, everything is intelligible, for only where
there is intelligibility is there cognition; beyond cognition, nothing exists
for cognition. But the whole of being does not by any means resolve into
intelligibility, it by cognition we mean scientifically cogent knowledge
capable of being communicated unchanged. This knowledge itself is always
particular, it refers always to definite, finite objects-whenever it approaches
the whole as such, it slides into fundamental fallacies.
答案是：沒錯，就我們的認知而言，一切皆可理解，因為只有可理解之處才有認知；超越認知，認知便無從談起。然而，存在的整體絕非可理解，這裡所說的認知指的是能夠原封不動地傳達的、科學嚴謹的知識。這種知識本身總是具體的，它總是指向確定的、有限的對象──一旦它試圖將整體視為整體，就會陷入根本的謬誤。
The world as a whole cannot be apprehended on the basis
of one or several or many intelligible principles. Cognition breaks it into
fragments-after the first erroneous and vain thrust toward the whole. Cognition
is in the world and does not comprehend the world. (Universal knowledge)-as in
mathematics and in the natural sciences-does indeed encompass something
universal, but never reality as a whole.
世界整體無法僅憑一個、幾個或許多可理解的原則來把握。認知在最初錯誤且徒勞地試圖掌握整體之後，便將其分割成碎片。認知存在於世界之中，卻無法理解世界本身。 （普遍知識）——例如數學和自然科學中的知識——確實包含某些普遍性的東西，但永遠無法涵蓋整個現實。
But it would be a new fallacy to effect a leap within
knowledge to other knowledge. To imagine, for instance, that at the limit of
the knowable there is a creator of the world, and to suppose that this creator
intervenes in the course of the world. As far as knowledge is concerned, these
are merely metaphoric tautologies for nonknowledge.
但若試圖從已有的知識跳躍到其他知識，則是一種新的謬誤。例如，設想在可知的極限處存在著一位世界的創造者，並假設這位創造者會幹預世界的運作進程。就知識而言，這些不過是無知的隱喻式同義反覆。
The world is disclosed as having no foundation in itself. But in himself man
finds what he finds nowhere else in the world: something unknowable,
undemonstrable, something that is never object, that evades all scientific
in-quiry: he finds freedom and what goes with it. In this sphere I have
experience not through knowledgé of something, but through action. Here the
road leads through the world and ourselves to transcendence.
世界被揭示為自身並無根基。然而，人卻在自身之中找到了世間其他任何地方都找不到的東西：某種不可知、不可證偽之物，某種永非客體、逃避一切科學探究之物：他找到了自由以及與之相伴的一切。在這個領域，我的經驗並非源自於對事物的認知，而是源自於行動。在此，道路引領我們穿越世界，也引領我們自身，最終抵達超越。
To those who deny it freedom cannot be proved like things that occur in the
world. But since the primal source of our action and our consciousness of being
lies in freedom, what man is, is not merely the object of knowledge, but also
of faith. Man's certainty as to his humanity is one of the basic elements of
philosophical faith.
對於那些否認自由的人來說，自由無法像世間萬物那樣被證明。然而，由於我們行動和存在意識的根本來源在於自由，因此，人的存在不僅是知識的對象，也是信仰的對象。人對自身人性的確信是哲學信仰的基本要素之一。
But man's freedom is inseparable from his consciousness of his finite nature.
但是，人的自由與他對自身有限本性的認識是密不可分的。
Let us briefly outline the main points: Man's finiteness is first of all the
finiteness of all living things. He is dependent upon his envirenment, upgn nourishment
and sensory contents; he is inexorably exposed to the mute and blind natural
process; he must die.,
讓我們簡單概述一下重點：人類的有限性首先是所有生物的有限性。他依賴環境、營養和感官體驗；他無可避免地暴露在無聲無息的自然進程中；他終將死亡。
Man's finiteness is secondly his dependence on other men, and on the historical
world produced by the human collectivity. He can rely on nothing in this world.
The fruits of fortuns come and go. The human order is ruled not only by
justice, but also by the power of the moment, that declares its arbitrary. will
to be the organ of justice, and hence is always based partly upon untruth.
人的有限性，其次在於他對他人的依賴，以及對人類集體所創造的歷史世界的依賴。在這個世界上，他無法依賴任何事物。命運的果實來來去去。人類秩序不僅受正義支配，也受當下力量支配，而當下力量宣稱其任意意志是正義的化身，因此總是部分建立在謊言之上。
State and national community can destroy men who work only on the leyalty of
man in existential communication, but this cannot be calculated. For what one
relies on here is not an objective, demonstrable reality. And the man closest
to one can at any time fall sick, go mad, die.
國家和民族共同體可以摧毀那些只在生存交流中依賴人性的人，但這無法預測。因為人們在此所依賴的並非客觀的、可證實的現實。而且，最親近的人隨時都可能生病、發瘋、死去。
Man's finiteness lies thirdly in the nature of his cognition, in his dependence
on the experience that is given him, especially on direct perception. My
intellect can apprehend nothing but the matter of direct perception that fills
in my concept.
人的有限性第三點在於其認知的本質，在於他對所獲得的經驗，尤其是對直接感知的依賴。我的理智只能理解構成我概念的直接感知的事物。
Man becomes conscious of his finiteness by comparison with something that is
not finite, with the absolute and the infinite:
人只有與非有限的事物，與絕對的、無限的事物比較，才會意識到自身的有限性：
The absolute bec0mes actual for him in his decision, the fulfillment of which
directs him to an origin) other than that which science makes intelligible to
him in his finite existence.
絕對對他而言在他的決定中變成了現實，而這一決定的實現將他引向一個起源（與科學在他有限的存在中所能理解的起源不同）。
The infinite is touched, though not apprehended, first in the idea of infinity,
then in the conception of a divine knowledge essentially different from man's
finite knowledge, finally in thoughts of immortality. The infinite which though
unfathomable does enter into man's consciousness, causes man to transcend his
finiteness by becoming aware of it.
無限雖不可完全把握，卻首先在無限的概念中被觸及；其次在與人類有限知識本質不同的神聖知識的構想中被觸及；最後在對永生的思考中被觸及。無限雖深不可測，卻能進入人類的意識，使人因意識到它的存在而超越自身的有限性。
Through the presence of the absolute and the infinite, man's finiteness does
not remain merely the unconscious datum of his empirical existence; but through
the light of transcendence it becomes the basic trait in his consciousness of
his created nature does. break through it. Thus though man cannot annul his
finiteness, he does break through it
透過絕對與無限的存在，人的有限性不再僅僅是其經驗存在的無意識事實；而是透過超越之光，成為其受造本性意識的基本特徵，並最終超越它。因此，儘管人無法消除自身的有限性，但他確實能夠超越它。
But if in the absoluteness of his décision in the face of everything finite in
the world, he becomes through his independence, certain of his infinity as his authentic
selfhood, this infinity also reveals a new mode of his finiteness. This finiteness
as existence means that even as himself man cannot ascribe himself to himself.
It is not through himself that he is originally himself. And just as he does
not owe his empirical existence in the world to his own will, his self is a
free gift to him by transcendence. He must be given to himself over and over
again, if he is not to lose himself. If man maintains his inner integrity in
the face of fate and even of death, he cannot do so by himself alone. What
helps him here is of a different kind than any help in the world. Transcendent
help reveals itself to him solely in the fact that he can be himself. That he
can stand by himself, he owes to an intangible hand, extended to him from
transcendence, a hand whose presence he can feel only in his freedom.
但是，如果一個人面對世間一切有限之物，憑藉其絕對的抉擇，透過獨立性，確信自身的無限性即為其真正的自我，那麼這種無限性也揭示了他有限性的一種新模式。這種作為存在的有限性意味著，即便作為自身，人也無法將自身歸於自身。他並非透過自身而成為他自己。正如他在世間的經驗存在並非源自自身意志，他的自我也是超越性賜給他的自由禮物。他必須不斷地將自己給予自己，否則他就會迷失自我。如果一個人要在面對命運乃至死亡時保持其內在的完整性，他無法僅憑自身之力做到。在此，幫助他的並非世間任何幫助。超越性的幫助，唯有在他能夠成為他自己這一事實中才能顯現自身。他能夠獨立自主，要歸功於一隻無形的手，這隻手來自超越層面，只有在自由中他才能感受到它的存在。
Man as object of investigation and man as freedom are known to us from
radically different sources. The former is a content of knowledge, the latter fundamenta
traitof our faith But if freedom for its part becomes a content of knowledge and
as object of in vestigation, s special feom of superitition arises:
我們對作為研究對象的人和作為自由的人的認識，源自於截然不同的來源。前者是知識的內容，後者是我們信仰的根本特徵。但如果自由本身成為知識的內容和研究對象，就會產生一種特殊的迷信形式：
Faith stands on the road to freedom that is not an absolute and not an empty
freedom, but that is experienced as the possibility of being given or not given
to oneself. It is only through freedom that I become certain of transcend-ence.
By freedom, to be sure, I attain to a point of independence from the world, but
precisely through the consciousness of my radical attachment to transcendence.
For it is not through myself that I am.
信仰立於通往自由的道路上，這自由並非絕對的，也非空洞的，而是體驗為一種選擇：給予或不給予自己。唯有透過自由，我才能確信超越的存在。誠然，透過自由，我得以擺脫世俗的束縛，但這恰恰是透過我徹底執著於超越的意識實現的。因為，我並非透過自身而存在。
Superstition on the other hand arises by way of a something that is the express
content of faith, and thus also through a supposed knowledge of free-dom. A
modern form of superstition, for example, is psychoanalysis taken as a
philosophy, and the pseudo-medicine that makes man's freedom a supposed object
of scientific research.
另一方面，迷信源自於信仰的明確內容，因此也源自於對自由的所謂認知。例如，現代迷信的一種形式是將精神分析視為一種哲學，以及將人類自由作為所謂科學研究對象的偽醫學。
As I conceive of the nature of my humanity, so I conceive of transcendence—i.e.
I conceive of it either as something that limits me or as something that
enables me to soar, it is superstition steeped in the object (hence associated
with scientific aberration), or faith, inner experience of the Comprehensive
(hence associated with the consummation of nonknowledge).
我如何理解我的人性本質，我就如何理解超越——也就是說，我如何理解它，要么是限制我的東西，要么是使我飛翔的東西；它是浸透於客體的迷信（因此與科學偏差相關），要么是信仰，是綜合的內在體驗（因此與無知的圓滿相關）。
Man, in common with everything he sees around him, in common with the beasts,
is branded as a finite creature. But his human finiteness cannot become
self-contained, in the same sense as the animal.
人與他周圍的一切事物，與野獸一樣，都被貼上了有限生命的標籤。但人性的有限性無法像動物那樣自我封閉。
Every animal is perfect in its own way, in its limitation it fulfills itself
within a continually repeated life cycle. It is exposed only to the natural
process in which all things merge and are brought forth. Only man cannot
fulfill himself in his finiteness. It is only, man whose finiteness involves
him in his-tory, in which he strives to realize his potentialities. His
openness is a sign of his freedom.
每種動物都有其自身的完美之處，它們在自身的限制中，於不斷重複的生命週期中實現自我。它們只受制於萬物融合、繁衍的自然過程。唯有人類無法在自身的有限性中獲得圓滿。正是人類的有限性，使他融入歷史，並在歷史中努力實現自身的潛能。他的開放性，正是他自由的標誌。
Because man cannot fulfill himself in his finite existence, because he must
forever search and strive (rather than live unconsciously in the unchanging rut
of recurrent cycles), he, alone of all living creatures, knows that he is
finite. Because of his incapacity for perfection, (his finiteness becomes more
to him ©than is revealed in the mere knowledge of the end) Man feels lost in
it, and as a result becomes aware of his task and potentialities. He
finds-himself in the most desperate situation, but in such a way, that from it
issues the strongest appeals to raise himself up through his freedom. And that
is why man has again and again been represented as the most astoundingly
contradictory of creatures, the most wretched and the most magnificent.
因為人無法在有限的生命中實現自我，因為他必須永遠探索和奮鬥（而不是無意識地生活在一成不變的循環往復之中），所以，在所有生物中，只有他知道自己是有限的。由於他無法達到完美（他的有限性對他而言遠不止於終點的認知），他感到迷失其中，並因此意識到自己的使命和潛能。他發現自己身處最絕望的境地，但正是在這種境地中，他發出最強烈的呼喚，促使他透過自由的力量提升自己。正因如此，人一次又一次地被描繪成最令人驚嘆、最矛盾的生物，既是最悲慘的，也是最偉大的。
The proposition that man is finite and unfullable has an ambivalent character.
It is an insight, it derives from demonstrable knowledge of the finite. But in
its universality it points to a faith content, in which the freedom of human
tasks is generated. In the fundamental experience of his nature, transcending
the plane of knowledge, he is aware of both his unfulfillment and his infinite
potentiality, his bondage and his freedom that breaks through this bondage.
人是有限且無法完全實現的命題具有矛盾的性質。它是一種洞見，源自於對有限性的可證認知。但其普遍性又指向一種信仰內涵，在這種信仰內涵中，人類任務的自由得以產生。在超越知識層面的本性根本體驗中，人既意識到自身的未竟之業，也意識到自身的無限潛能；既意識到自身的束縛，也意識到突破這種束縛的自由。
Conscious of his freedom, man desires to become what he can and should be. He
conceives an ideal of his nature. As on the plane of cognition, the idea of man
as an object of scientific inquiry may lead to a falsely definitive image of
him, so on the plane of freedom he may falsely choose a path leading to an
absolute ideal. From helpless questioning and bewilderment, he thus aspires to
take refuge in a universal that he can imitate in its concrete forms.
意識到自身的自由，人渴望成為他能夠也應該成為的人。他構思出一個關於自身本性的理想。正如在認知層面，將人視為科學研究對象可能會導致對人產生一種錯誤的、確定性的認知一樣，在自由層面，人也可能錯誤地選擇一條通往絕對理想的道路。因此，他渴望從無助的疑問和困惑中尋求庇護，寄託於一種他可以在具體形式中模仿的普遍真理。
There are numerous images of man that have served as ideals with which we
wished to identify ourselves. There is no doubt that such ideals have been
effective, and that social types actually influence our behavior. The ideal can
be magnified to a vague conception of man's "greatness," of something
in man that is in a sense more than human, that is superhuman or inhuman.
歷史上存在著許多人類形象，它們曾經作為我們渴望認同的理想而存在。毫無疑問，這些理想確實有效，社會類型也確實影響著我們的行為。這種理想可以放大為一種模糊的人類「偉大」概念，一種超越人類、超凡脫俗甚至非人特質的概念。
For our philosophical consciousness it is crucial that we convince ourselves of
the untruth and impossibility of such paths. Kant has given us the purest
expression of this. "To attempt to realize the ideal in an example, that
is, as a real phenomenon, as we might represent a perfectly wise man in a
novel, is impossible, nay, absurd, and but little encouraging, because the
nat-. ural limits, which are constantly interfering with the perfection in the
idea, make all illusion in such an experiment impossible, and thus render the
good itself in the idea suspicious and unreal."
對於我們的哲學意識而言，至關重要的是，我們必須確信此類路徑的虛假性和不可能。康德對此給出了最純粹的表述：「試圖在實例中實現理想，即將其作為一種真實現象來實現，就像我們在小說中描繪一個完美智者那樣，是不可能的，甚至是荒謬的，而且毫無益處，因為自然的限制不斷幹擾著理念的完美，使得此類實驗中的一切都成為不可能，從而使幻像中的善本身變得可疑和不真實。」
Just as we lose sight of man when he becomes an object of scientific inquiry in
racial theory, psychoanalysis, or Marxism and is represented as fully
understandable, so we lose sight of the human task when he becomes an ideal.
正如當人們成為種族理論、精神分析或馬克思主義中的科學研究對象，並被描繪成完全可以理解的人時，我們就失去了對人的認識一樣，當人成為理想時，我們就失去了對人類任務的認識。
The ideal is something fundamentally different from the idea. There is no ideal
of man, but there is an idea of man. Ideals of man collapse, the idea of man
serves as a goal to his march forward. Ideals can in a sense be schemata of
ideas, road signs. That is the truth in the great philosophical conceptions of
the Noble Man in China, or of the Stoic Wise Man. They are not images of
fulfillment, they only stimulate man's desire to rise above himself.
理想與理念有著本質上的差異。人沒有理想，但人有理念。人的理想終將消逝，人的理念則成為人前進的目標。理想在某種意義上可以被視為理念的框架，路標。這正是中國古代「貴族」或斯多葛派「智者」等偉大哲學思想的真諦所在。它們並非圓滿的化身，而只是激發人們超越自我的渴望。
Something else again is orientation by the honored and beloved historical
figure. We may ask: What would he say in this case, how would he act? And we
enter into a living discussion with him, though without regarding him as the
absolutely true model to be imitated unconditionally. For each man is a man,
and therefore lives in finiteness and imperfection, and also in error.
還有一點，那就是受到這位受人尊敬和愛戴的歷史人物的指引。我們可以問：在這種情況下，他會說什麼？他會怎麼做？於是我們與他展開了一場生動的對話，但這並不意味著我們要無條件地效法他，把他視為絕對真理的典範。因為每個人都是人，因此都有限制、不完美，也難免犯錯。
All ideals of man are impessible, because man's
potentialities are infinite.There can be no perfect nian. This has important
philosaphical consequences.
人類的一切理想都是不可能的，因為人類的潛能是無限的。不可能存在完美的人。這具有重要的哲學意義。
1. The true value of man lies not in the species or type that he approxi-mates,
but in the historical individual, for whom no substitution or replacement is
possible. The value of each individual man can be regarded as unassailable only
when men cease to be regarded as expendable material, to be stamped by a
universal. The social and professional types that we approximate have bearing
only on our role in the world.
1. 人的真正價值不在於他所接近的物種或類型，而在於他作為歷史個體的獨特性，這種獨特性是任何替代或取代都無法企及的。只有當人不再被視為可消耗的物質，不再被某種普遍性所定義時，每個人的價值才能被視為無可置疑。我們所接近的社會和職業類型，僅僅與我們在世界上的角色有關。
2. The idea that all men are equal is obviously false, in so far as
psychological aptitudes and talents are concerned,—it is also untrue considered
as the reality of a social order, in which at best there can be equal
opportunities and equity before the law.
2. 就心理能力和才能而言，人人生而平等的想法顯然是錯誤的；就社會秩序的現實而言，這種想法也是錯誤的，因為在社會秩序中，充其量只能實現機會平等和法律面前人人平等。
The essential equality of all men lies alone in those depths, where to each man
the road is opened by freedom to attain to God by leading an ethical life. It
is the equality of a value that no human knowledge can ascertain or objectify,
of the individual as an eternal soul. It is the equality of rights, and of the
eternal judgment according to which a man merits a place in heaven or hell.
This equality means: a respect for every man which forbids that any man should
be treated only as a means and not at the same time as an end in himself.
所有人的本質平等，唯有存在於那深邃的境界之中，在那裡，每個人都能自由地透過實踐倫理生活而抵達上帝的彼岸。這種平等關乎一種人類知識無法確定或客觀衡量的價值，關乎個體作為永恆靈魂的平等。它關乎權利的平等，也關乎永恆審判的平等，而正是這審判決定了人最終是進入天堂還是地獄。這種平等意味著：對每個人的尊重，禁止將任何人僅僅視為手段，而不應將其視為目的本身。
The danger facing man is the self-assurance which tells him that he already is
what he is capable of becoming. The faith by which he finds the road of his
potentialities, becomes then a possession that concludes his road, whether it
take the form of moral self-complacency or of pride in his innate gifts.
人類面臨的危險在於那種自以為是的自信，這種自信讓他認為自己已經達到了他所能達到的高度。他賴以找到自身潛能之路的信念，最終會成為他人生旅程的終點，無論這種信念表現為道德上的自滿，還是對自身天賦的驕傲。
From the Stoic view that man should live so as to be pleasing to himself, to
the harmony with himself that Kant ascribes to the man who acts in an ethical
way there has prevailed an arbitrary self-complacency, to which St.Paul and St.
Augustine, indeed Kant himself opposed the idea of man corrupted in the root.
從斯多葛學派認為人應該為了取悅自己而生活的觀點，到康德認為以合乎道德的方式行事的人應該與自己和諧相處的觀點，已經盛行了一種任意的自滿情緒，聖保羅、聖奧古斯丁，甚至康德本人都反對這種情緒，認為人從根本上就是腐敗的。
The essential is that man as existence in his freedom should experience the
fact of being given to himself by transcendence. Then human freedom is at the
heart of all his potentialities and through transcendence, through the one, man
is guided to his own inner unity.
關鍵在於，人作為自由的存在，應當體驗到超越性賦予自身的存在。如此，人的自由便成為其一切潛能的核心；而透過超越性，透過那唯一，人便被引導至其內在的統一。
This guidance is radically different from any guidance in the world; for it
offers no objective certainty; it coincides with man's complete attainment of freedom.
For it operates only by way of the freedom of subjective certainty.God's voice
resides in the light that comes as his own conviction to the individual open to
tradition and his environment. God's voice becomes audible in the freedom of
subjective conviction, and this is the only organ by which it can impart itself
to man. Where man's resolve arises out of his depths, he believes that he is
obeying God, though he has no objective guaranty for his knowledge of God's
will.
這種指引與世間任何指引都截然不同；因為它不提供任何客觀的確定性；它與人類完全獲得自由相契合。因為它只能透過主觀確定性的自由來發揮作用。上帝的聲音存在於那道光中，這道光以祂自身的信念的形式臨到那些對傳統和環境持開放態度的人。上帝的聲音在主觀信念的自由中變得清晰可聞，這也是祂向人類傳遞自身的唯一途徑。當人的決心源自於內心深處時，他便相信自己是在服從上帝，儘管他無法客觀地保證自己了解上帝的旨意。
Guidance operates through man's judgment concerning his own acts. This judgment
checks him and spurs him on, corrects and confirms. But in fact, man can never
wholly and definitively base his judgment concerning himself upon himself. He
desires to hear the judgment of his fellow men, in order to attain clarity
through communication. But, the crucial judgment is not the last analysis tnat
of the people he esteems, although this is the only judgment that is accessible
to him in practice. The decisive judgment would be that of God:
指引是透過人對自身行為的判斷而發揮作用的。這種判斷既能約束人，又能激勵人，既能糾正人，也能印證人的行為。但事實上，人永遠無法完全且最終地將對自身的判斷建立在自身之上。他渴望聆聽他人的評判，以便透過交流獲得清晰的認識。然而，至關重要的判斷並非他所尊重之人的最終評價，儘管這在實踐中是他唯一能夠獲得的判斷。決定性的判斷來自上帝：
Thus in time the truth of judgment is ultimately attained only by way of
subjective conviction, whether the moral law claims universal or only historical
validity.
因此，無論道德法則主張普遍有效性或僅主張歷史有效性，判斷的真理最終只能透過主觀信念來獲得。
Inward obedience to the freely accepted, universal ethical law—to the ten
commandments-is bound up with the realization that transcendençe is present in
this very freedom.
內心對自由接受的普遍倫理法則──十誡──的服從，與認知到超越性就存在於這種自由之中密不可分。
But since specific action cannot logically be deduced from the universal law,
God's guiding voice can be heard more directly in the primal source of the
historically concrete law than in the universal. But for all the subjective
certainty this voice gives, its meaning remains uncertain. Obedience to God's
voice always involves the risk of error. For its message is susceptible to many
interpretations, the freedom that would consist in the clear and unmistakable
knowledge of the necessary, is never complete. The risk implied in the question
of whether in this matter I am really myself, whether I have truly heard the
guiding voice from the primal spring of being, never ceases.
但由於具體行動無法從普遍法則中邏輯推導出來，因此，上帝的指引之聲與其說是從普遍法則中聆聽，不如說是從歷史具體法則的原始源泉中聆聽得更為直接。然而，儘管這聲音賦予人主觀上的確定性，但意義卻依然不確定。服從上帝的聲音總是伴隨著犯錯的風險。因為其訊息可以有多種解讀，所以，那種基於對必然之物的清晰明確認知的自由，永遠無法達到完全。關於「在這件事上，我是否真正做我自己？我是否真正聽到了來自存在原始源泉的指引之聲？」這一問題所蘊含的風險，永無止境。
In time, this consciousness of risk remains the condition for increasing
freedom. It excludes complete reliance on subjective certainty, forbids the
generalization of the subjective commandment into a universal law, and bars
fanaticism. Even in the certainty of the resolve, there must, in so far as it
is translated into practical action, remain a certain margin of
indetermination.
隨著時間的推移，這種風險意識始終是獲得更大自由的必要條件。它排除了對主觀確定性的完全依賴，禁止將主觀準則概括為普遍法則，並遏制了狂熱。即使在堅定的決心中，一旦轉化為實際行動，也必須保留一定的不確定性。
There can be no subjective security. The pride of the
absolute truth destroys truth in the world. The humility of the permanent
question is inherent in subjective certainty. For it is always possible that
things will subsequently look quite different. Even the clear, but never
adequately clear conscience, can embark on error.
不存在主觀上的絕對安全感。對絕對真理的驕傲會摧毀世間的真理。對永恆問題的謙遜是主觀確定性所固有的。因為事物總有可能在之後呈現出截然不同的面貌。即使是清明的良心，也永遠無法完全清明，同樣會誤入歧途。
Only in retrospect are we justified in admiring the unfathomable wisdom of
God's guidance. But even then it is never certain, God's unfathomable guidance
can never become a possession.
只有在回顧往事時，我們才有資格讚歎上帝指引的深不可測的智慧。但即便如此，也無法確定的是，上帝深不可測的指引永遠無法成為我們的私有財產。
From the psychological point of view, God's voice has no other
expression in time than man's judgment of himself. This judgment may come upon
man with a sudden certainty, after man has honestly and carefully striven for
it, weighing all the contradictory possibilities; and then he discovers in it
God's judgment, though it is never definitive and always equivocal. But only in
exalted moments is it audible. It is by such moments and for such moments that
we live.
從心理學的角度來看，上帝的聲音在時間中唯一的表達方式就是人對自己的評判。這種評判或許會在人誠實而謹慎地努力，權衡所有相互矛盾的可能性之後，突然以一種確定無疑的方式降臨到人身上；那時，人便會在其中發現上帝的評判，儘管它從來都不是最終的，總是模棱兩可的。但只有在崇高的時刻，它才能被聽見。我們正是為這樣的時刻而活，也正是為了這樣的時刻而活。
The road of the thinking man is a philosophical life, Philosophizing is a
specifically human pursuit. Man is the only being in the world to whom being is
manifested through his empirical existence. He cannot fulfill himself in
empirical existence as such, he cannot content himself with the enjoyment of empirical
existence. He breaks through all the empirical realities that find their
seeming fulfillment in the world. As a man he only attains to real knowledge of
himself when, open to being as a whole, he relates his life in the world to
transcendence. In the very effort to master his empirical existence, he strives
toward being. For he cannot adequately account for his sojourn in the world by
the laws immanent to the world. Accordingly, he goes beyond his empirical
existence, beyond the world, to the ground of existence and the world, where he
attains awareness of his primal seurce. Here, though in a sense he is in
communion with creation, he does not find a secure refuge, nor is he at his
goal. He must seek eternity in his life, which mediates between the primal
source and the goal.
思考者的道路是一條哲學之路，哲學思考是人類特有的追求。人是世間唯一透過經驗存在來展現自身存在的存在。他無法在經驗存在本身中獲得圓滿，也無法滿足於享受經驗存在。他突破了所有看似在世間圓滿的經驗現實。作為一個人，只有當他敞開心扉接納整體的存在，並將自身在世間的生命與超越聯繫起來時，他才能獲得對自身的真正認知。在努力駕馭自身經驗存在的過程中，他正朝著存在本身邁進。因為他無法用世界固有的法則來充分解釋他在世間的旅程。因此，他超越了經驗存在，超越了世界，到達存在和世界的根基，在那裡，他覺察到自身的原始源頭。在此，雖然從某種意義上說他與受造物相通，但他並未找到安全的庇護所，也未抵達終點。祂必須在生命中尋求永恆，這永恆是連結原始源頭與最終目標的橋樑。
In unfaith the human condition becomes a biological faet
among other biological facts; man surrenders to what his finite knowledge
determines as necessities and inevitabilities, he gives in to a sense of
futility, the energy of his mind declines. He stifles in his supposed factuality.
在不信中，人類的境況淪為眾多生物學事實中的一種生物學事實；人屈服於他有限的知識所認定的必然性和不可避免性，他陷入一種徒勞感，他的精神活力衰退。他在他所謂的“事實性”中窒息。
Philosophical faith, on the other hand, is the faith of man in his potentialities.
In it breathes his freedom.
另一方面，哲學信仰是人類對自身潛能的信仰。自由就蘊藏其中。
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